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The problem ‘human and work’ in a model working group is investigated by means of cellular
automata technique. Attitude of members of a group towards work is measured by an indicator
of loyalty to the group (the number of agents who carry out their tasks), and lack of loyalty (the
number of agents, who give their tasks to other agents). Initially, all agents realize scheduled tasks
one-by-one. Agents with the number of scheduled tasks larger than a given threshold change their
strategy to unloyal one and start avoiding completing tasks by passing them to their colleagues.
Optionally, in some conditions, we allow agents to return to loyal state; hence the rule is hysteretic.
Results are presented on an influence of i) the density of tasks, ii) the threshold number of tasks
assigned to the agents’ forcing him/her for strategy change on the system efficiency. We show that
a ‘black’ scenario of the system stacking in a ‘jammed phase’ (with all agents preferring unloyal
strategy and having plenty tasks scheduled for realization) may be avoided when return to loyalty is
allowed and either i) the number of agents chosen for task realization, or ii) the number of assigned
tasks, or iii) the threshold value of assigned tasks, which force the agent to conversion from loyal
strategy to unloyal one, or iv) the threshold value of tasks assigned to unloyal agent, which force
him/her to task redistribution among his/her neighbors, are smartly chosen.
PACS numbers: 89.65.-s,89.65.Ef,89.75.-k,89.75.Fb
Keywords: Social and economic systems; Social organizations; anthropology; Complex systems; Structures
and organization in complex systems
I. INTRODUCTION
In modeling social phenomena, most important obsta-
cle is the complexity of human mind. Individual decisions
depend not only on the present status of the environ-
ment, but also on the whole history of a given person.
For a descriptive theory of individual decisions see [1].
A predictive theory needs causal relations, what under-
mines free will of human beings. Yet, from the point of
view of a modeler, the eternal discussion of the free will
is somewhat vain: even in a fully deterministic world, to
identify the boundary between ‘yes’ and ‘no’ in a complex
multidimensional space of arguments, constructed in our
memory, is a hopeless task. (For a recent and provoca-
tive formulation of the problem of free will see Ref. [2].)
When collective effects are concerned, social modelers pin
their hopes in the law of large numbers, where an individ-
ual can be reduced to a black box. How deep reduction
is legitimated, depends heavily on the modeler’s purpose;
social libraries are filled up with self-defending proclama-
tions. For an outstandingly realistic approach we refer to
writings of Bruce Edmonds [3]. Also, a set of articles in
Ref. [4] can be recommended. Our position here is that
it is worthwhile to try to imagine consequences of our
memory for collective effects, even if no grounded scien-
tific strategy justifies a concomitant set of assumptions.
∗ http://home.agh.edu.pl/malarz/; malarz@agh.edu.pl
† kulakowski@fis.agh.edu.pl
Once again, to keep the task simple, at least computa-
tionally, cellular automata (CA) are invaluable.
In CA, memory can be introduced directly by an en-
richment of the rule, as it was done in the construction
of a reversible automaton [5]. There, the cell state at
time t depends not only on the environment state at time
t − 1 but also on the state at time t − 2. Another ap-
proach is to make the rule dependent of the mean state
variable, calculated over the whole system history [6].
Here we prefer to switch to a new rule, when a given
condition is fulfilled by the cell state. In this way the
system refers to its memory in a dynamical way, which
cannot be predicted before the simulation is performed;
this characteristics of the problem is known as the com-
putational irreducibility [7]. Further, the system can be
switched back to the previous rule, if another condition
is met. This kind of hysteretic rule has been applied in
man-machine systems, where different sets of rules have
been switched on by different procedures [8, 9]. Here we
apply it as to refer to the human ability to modify the
cognitive context as to enable decisions [10]. It remains
in a general accordance with the psychological concept
of scripts [1], which is activated once; further behavior of
an individual is executed according to this script.
Many works that have appeared in the last decade,
have shown the usefulness of CA in the field of modeling
various aspects of organization’s management systems.
Human (group of people) and work (workflow) are key
elements of the management system, thus, the analysis of
these elements and their relationships is a major subject
of research in this area. Robbins et al. [11] formulate
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2the three ‘paths of research’ in business management.
They are: workflow optimization (work), human group
behavior (human), and human-things interaction (human
and work).
The study of group behavior using the model based on
CA is fairly common, because it is a tool tailored to the
nature and dynamics of social processes. Broad discus-
sion of this subject was submitted by inter alia Hegsel-
mann and Flache [12]. What provide the universality of
CA are emerging attempts to build models within the two
other perspectives of research in the field of management.
For example, Hassan and Tucker [13] have demonstrated
the use of CA to optimize locations of objects (facility
layout problem). Optimizing of rearranging—for exam-
ple, machine in the production floor—leads to minimiza-
tion of transport costs (time) and thus it is a typical task
in the field of workflow optimization. Thirumaran et al.
[14] proposed a simulation model which allows to sup-
port the analysis of changes in the business processes of
customer service web portal. In both approaches, the in-
dividual agents (the automaton cells) represent the tech-
nical facilities and business rules and do not have a direct
relationship with employees.
In this work we are interested in prospect of ‘human
and work’ research. In this area, the main goal of re-
searchers is to build CA models, which are tools allowing
to explain the global behavior of the analyzed system
based on local interactions within groups of employees,
and between employees and broadly understood environ-
ment. Agents in such models represent the people (em-
ployees) and the parameters (attributes). The CA rules
represent procedures, which shall be adopted on the ba-
sis of more or less simplified assumptions and/or socio-
psychological theories and knowledge of the organization
and management theory.
The theoretical model in this perspective was proposed
by Bin and Zhang [15]. This model allows analyzing the
impact of managerial decisions on the behavior of mem-
bers of a group towards work—measured by specific in-
dicator of loyalty to the group (in accordance with the
general sociological message that a group loyal to each
other is effective in achieving the objectives). The au-
thors assume, in accordance with the theory of ‘social
exchange’, that people are motivated by a desire for so-
cial status and respect as much as they are motivated
by gains that are material and/or monetary. They intro-
duce, by splitting the group members into ‘economic be-
ings’ and ‘social beings’, the possibility to analyze man-
agement policy, which consists of incentives of economic
and/or social nature. The direction of movement de-
pends on the assumed policy and the type of agent (a
social agent is attracted by social incentives, and eco-
nomic agent by material ones). The simulation finishes
with a state of equilibrium, and the evaluation of the
applied policy consists of determining indicator loyalty
value for a group for this state.
Another, more complex approach is presented in the
work of Shengping and Bin [16]. The proposed model
takes into account the types of work performed by a
group of employees. The authors introduced the char-
acteristics of the tasks on a scale from ‘hard’ to ‘soft’
work. Hard work must be completed chiefly with techni-
cal ability and soft work must be done with social com-
munication ability. Employees were also categorized into
groups on the scale of a continuum between ‘working
hard’ and ‘social’. An interaction between neighboring
agents consisting of ‘reconciling’ the way they cooper-
ate (on a scale hard/social) of each agent with ambient
agents (on the principle of the adoption pattern of ma-
jority) has also been introduced. Simulated at each step,
the overall ‘state behavior’ of the group, is therefore a
function of many factors including his/her behavior in
last time step, his/her neighbors’ behavior, his/her prop-
erties, characteristic and state of the work. Although the
precise interpretation of such a complex indicator is dif-
ficult, in general, the level of ‘state behavior’ reflects the
(average) degree of positive attitude towards work and in
a broad sense can be associated with the level of loyalty,
which was proposed in Ref. [15].
Management policy analysis in the perspective of the
work initiated in Ref. [15] provides a model for the pro-
posed work of Saravakos and Sirakoulis [17]. The au-
thors, in a simple implementation of CA technique, have
proposed the characteristics of workers behavior in the
seven-point scale from extremely negative to absolutely
positive. As the second dimension of agent features indi-
cator depicting each employee’s insistence, his ability to
remain ‘uninfluenced’ by his coworkers was adopted. In-
sistence takes values from one to five, where one denotes
an employee who is highly influenced by his neighborhood
and thus his behavior is determined by his coworkers; five
is the total resistance to the influence of neighbors. For
intermediate sizes weights of impact were adopted. In-
troduced behavioral rules allow to simulate (in each step)
attitude change of each agent according to its attitude in
the previous step, and the characteristics of its neigh-
bors. Additionally, in the model it was assumed that in-
sistence is an adaptable trait and depends on the extent
the employee is conformed to the organizational norms.
Organizational norms are determined by the company
policy. The organization’s policy is represented by the
‘reward’ coefficient (for positive behavior for agents with
low insistence) and ‘punishment’ coefficient (for negative
behaviors and a large insistence). Overall assessment of
the behavior of group in a given environment is the aver-
age ‘loyalty factor’. The main use of the model is to ana-
lyze the behavior of the tested group of workers (mainly
by a loyalty factor) in the conditions of use of different
combinations of reward and punishment levels.
The general idea of the analysis of key factors and rela-
tionships in the term ‘human and work’ and the ability to
simulate specific managerial decision is also used in the
proposed model in this article. Loyalty is measured by
the number of loyal agents who carry out their tasks, and
the lack of loyalty is expressed by the number of unloyal
agents, who give their tasks to other agents.
3The latter activity is a channel of interaction between
neighbors, what enables collective states. The current
strategy of a worker depends on the actual number of
his/her awaiting tasks, what makes the changes dynam-
ical and presumably complex. Shifted tasks make the
neighboring workers overburdened, what enhances the
probability that they will also shift their tasks; this posi-
tive feedback allows to expect sharp transitions between
collective states.
A related problem in real life is the phenomenon of
work stress induced burnout, which can lead to a selfish
strategy to shifting duties to colleagues. The problem is
related to a number of professional groups, as nurses [18]
and police officers [19]. The unloyal state takes the form
of absenteeism and/or passivity. Basically, the transition
to this state is irreversible; therefore the return to the
loyal state, considered below, could be interpreted as the
staff turnover.
At the group level, the opposition between the loyal
and the unloyal phase is an example of a social dilemma,
as defined in Ref. [20]: a dichotomous choice of strat-
egy, and the choice which is individually profitable, but
makes worse when universally adopted. The concept of
social dilemma is a generalization of the famous pris-
oner’s dilemma, and it is used to discuss it in the frames
of the game theory; for a simple introduction we recom-
mend Ref. [21]. Our assumption here is that the transi-
tion of an individual from the loyal to the unloyal phase
is triggered by the large number of tasks. However, the
unloyal behavior can be seen also as a reasonable strat-
egy of self-preference, when the number of tasks exceeds
some threshold. Thus, the frames of game theory en-
able yet another interpretation of the transition from the
unloyal back to the loyal state.
In subsequent sections we define the cellular automa-
ton (Sec. II) and we present main results Sec. IV (in-
cluding model verification Sec. III) obtained by means
of computer simulations. The Sec. V is devoted to the
discussion of the results and conclusions.
II. MODEL
The model working group contains L×L agents occu-
pying nodes of a square lattice. Each agent may follow
one of two strategies (loyal or unloyal to the group). In
the latter case an agent distributes his/her task among
his/her nearest neighbors. The loyal agents do not
bother their neighbors with their own task and during
each time step they complete one of their tasks. We start
our simulations with group of loyal agents without any
tasks assigned to them. Agent loyal to the group but hav-
ing more than some threshold number of scheduled tasks
changes his/her strategy to unloyal one. Unloyal agents
having assigned more than assumed threshold number
of task shift part of their task to their adjacent neigh-
bors. These neighbors unconditionally take these ad-
ditional tasks independently on the current number of
tasks assigned to them. The number of tasks awaiting
for realization by a single agent cannot exceed the agent’s
maximal task capacity. Incoming tasks are randomly dis-
tributed among different agents. Finally, but optionally,
we allow unloyal agents to convert to loyal ones. This step
may be realized either as soon as unloyal agent shifts out
all the tasks assigned to him/her or when unloyal agent
has not more than some threshold value of tasks.
To implement the model described above the CA tech-
nique has been chosen.
A cellular automaton [7, 22–24] consists of a regular
grid of cells, each in one of a finite number of states.
At each time step, a new generation of the cells’ states
is created, according to some fixed rule that determines
the new state of each cell in terms of the current state
of the cell and the states of the cells in its neighborhood.
Here, von Neumann neighborhood on L × L square bi-
layer lattice with lateral periodic boundary conditions is
assumed, i.e. the site (i, j) have exactly z = 4 neighbors
at sites (i±1, j), (i, j±1). The first lattice layer indicates
agents strategy (loyal X(i, j) = 0 or unloyal X(i, j) = 1).
The second layer carries information on current number
of tasks k(i, j) = 0, · · · ,M assigned to (i, j)-th agent. We
start simulation with L2 loyal agents awaiting for their
first tasks, i.e.
X(i, j) = 0 and k(i, j) = 0 for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ L.
The automata rule is as follow:
1. K different sites (i, j) are selected randomly. The
number of tasks assigned to agents occupying these
sites is incremented by Z:
kt+1/6(i, j) ≡ kt(i, j) + Z, (1a)
Xt+1/6(i, j) ≡ Xt(i, j). (1b)
2. Each loyal agent (Xt+1/6(i, j) = 0) with more than
R tasks assigned to him/her (kt+1/6(i, j) > R)
changes his/her strategy to unloyal one:
Xt+2/6(i, j) ≡ 1, (2a)
kt+2/6(i, j) ≡ kt+1/6(i, j). (2b)
3. Each loyal agent (Xt+2/6(i, j) = 0) realizes one of
his/her task:
kt+3/6(i, j) ≡ max{kt+2/6(i, j)− 1, 0}, (3a)
Xt+3/6(i, j) ≡ Xt+2/6(i, j). (3b)
4. Each unloyal agent (Xt+3/6(i, j) = 1) with more
than T [and (z − 1) ≤ T ≤ R] tasks assigned
to him/her (kt+3/6(i, j) > T ) redistributes his/her
4own tasks among his/her (z = 4) nearest neighbors
kt+4/6(i, j) ≡ kt+3/6(i, j)− z, (4a)
Xt+4/6(i, j) ≡ Xt+3/6(i, j), (4b)
and
kt+4/6(i− 1, j) ≡ kt+3/6(i− 1, j) + 1, (4c)
kt+4/6(i+ 1, j) ≡ kt+3/6(i+ 1, j) + 1, (4d)
kt+4/6(i, j − 1) ≡ kt+3/6(i, j − 1) + 1, (4e)
kt+4/6(i, j + 1) ≡ kt+3/6(i, j + 1) + 1. (4f)
5. The number of tasks scheduled to a single agent
cannot exceed maximal agent’s capacity M :
kt+5/6 ≡ min{kt+4/6(i, j),M}, (5a)
Xt+5/6 ≡ Xt+4/6(i, j). (5b)
6. The conversion of unloyal agent (Xt+5/6(i, j) = 1)
to loyal member of the group is possible
Xt+6/6(i, j) ≡ 0 (6a)
kt+6/6(i, j) ≡ kt+5/6(i, j) (6b)
(A) after shifting out all of his/her tasks
(kt+5/6(i, j) = 0).
(B) Alternatively, we allow for unloyal agents re-
laxation to loyal ones when they have no more
than T tasks (kt+5/6(i, j) ≤ T ).
The steps 6(A) or 6(B) are realized only optionally.
We will show that realization of these steps is cru-
cial for avoiding ‘black scenario’ of working group
total ‘jamming’.
If steps 6(A) and 6(B) are omitted then simply
Xt+6/6(i, j) ≡ Xt+5/6(i, j), kt+6/6(i, j) ≡ kt+5/6(i, j).
The steps described above are consecutively and syn-
chronously applied to all sites. The results for apply-
ing steps 1–5, 1–5+6(A) and 1–5+6(B) are collected in
Secs. IVA, IVB1 and IVB2, respectively.
III. MODEL VERIFICATION
The model verification for computer models means the
model evaluation or ‘process of reaching to sufficient con-
fidence that the model is ready for use in particular case’
[27]. In order to verify [4] our model we inspect single
agent temporal evolution of
(A) the number ` of his/her unloyal nearest neighbors,
(B) his/her strategy X,
(C) and the number k of tasks currently scheduled for
her/him.
These dependencies are shown in A, B, C panels of Fig. 1.
Four sub-figures of Fig. 1 correspond to possibility of
agents back conversion to loyalty (1c,1d) and reasonably
(1a, 1c, K = 5) or enhanced (1b, 1d, K = 8) tasks deliv-
ering. For these set of parameters (L = 10, M = 16, R =
8, Z = 4, T = 3) the system becomes totally ‘jammed’:
for long enough times of simulation all agents become
overburdened and have to complete M tasks. The relax-
ation to loyalty is realized according to the rule 6(A). As
expected the integer number of agents’ unloyal nearest
neighbors vary between 0 and z (` ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4 = z},
panels A of Fig. 1) and the number of tasks assigned
to single agent cannot exceed assumed maximal num-
ber M = 16 (k ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,M − 1,M}, panels C of
Fig. 1). For irreversible transition to the unloyal strat-
egy only single transition of state Xt = 0 → Xt+1 = 1
is expected as presented in panels B of Figs. 1a and 1b.
On the contrary, for the rule 6(A) multiple transitions
Xt = 0 → Xt+1 = 1 and Xt = 1 → Xt+1 = 0 may be
observed [panels B of Figs. 1c and 1d].
IV. RESULTS
A. Irreversible transition to the unloyalty
In Fig. 2 the time evolution of spatial distribution of
unloyal agents is presented. The back conversions of un-
loyal agents to loyal ones are excluded, i.e. we do not
realize the optional 6-th step from our algorithm pre-
sented in Sec. II. The periodic boundary conditions are
assumed. After t > 20 unloyal agents appear more likely
at the border of existing unloyal agents’ cluster.
The time evolution of the average fraction of unloyal
agents [〈ρ〉] (percent) and the average number of tasks per
agent [〈k〉] are presented in Fig. 3. Here, 〈· · · 〉 denotes
a spatial average over all L2 agents and [· · · ] stands for
an average over N different simulations. Obviously, in-
creasing number of sites K where new tasks are delivered
must lead to decreasing time (τo) after which all agents
become unloyal and to decreasing time (τt) after which
all agents have to complete maximally allowed number
M of tasks. These times (τo, τt) dependencies on num-
ber K of agents chosen for new Z tasks realization are
presented in Fig. 4.
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FIG. 1: An example of the time evolution of (A) the number of the unloyal agents in agent’s neighborhood `, (B) the agent
state X and (C) the number k of tasks assigned for a single agent. In simulations presented in panels (a) and (b) the back
conversions of unloyal agents to loyal ones were excluded. In cases (c) and (d) the step 6(A) is realized. L = 10, M = 16,
Z = 4, R = 8, T = 3.
Please note, that after time t > τt the newly incom-
ing tasks are lost, as all both unloyal and overburdened
agents ignore them. This situation is caused by the as-
sumed numerical technique (CA), in which single lattice
cell may stay in finite number of states (here two, for the
first automaton layer, and M for the second one). This
however, does not influence our results qualitatively, as
increasing of maximal agents capacity M results only in
a delay in reaching overburden state of all agents (see
Fig. 5a); the time of conversion all agents to unloyal
group members (τt) remains unchanged. Time τt grows
with M roughly linearly (see Fig. 5b).
This transition can be verified by a comparison with
a simplified picture, obtained with a mean field model
of a square lattice of agents. The equation is composed
in the spirit of Refs. [25, 26], where the set of states is
reduced to unloyal (with probability ρ) and loyal (with
probability 1− ρ);
ρ˙ = f(ρ) =
2∑
i=0
(
4
i
)[
(1− ρ)1+iρ4−i − ρ1+i(1− ρ)4−i]+ (1− ρ)h,
(7)
where the terms on the r.h.s. of Eq. (7) for i = 0 are
related to a creation/anihilation of unloyal agent in the
neighborhood of four unloyal/loyal ones, the terms for
i = 1 describe a creation/anihilation of unloyal agent in
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FIG. 2: The time evolution of spatial distribution of unloyal agents. The back conversions of unloyal agents to loyal ones are
excluded. L = 10, M = 16, Z = 4, R = 8, K = 10, T = 3.
7FIG. 3: The time evolution of the average fraction of
unloyal agents [〈ρ〉] (upper panel) and the average number of
tasks per agent [〈k〉] (down panel). The back conversions of
unloyal agents to loyal ones are excluded. L = 10, M = 16,
Z = 4, R = 8, T = 3. The results are averaged over N = 100
simulations.
the neighborhood of three unloyal/loyal ones, etc. The
last term (field h > 0) is a creation of unloyal agent
because of an external flow of tasks [25].
For h = 0 we get three fixed points: ρ∗0 = 1, ρ∗1 = 0
(both stable) and ρ∗2 =
1
2 (unstable). When h increases
to hb ≈ 0.06493966 · · · , the roots ρ∗1 and ρ∗2 merge at the
saddle-node bifurcation (see Fig. 6) and the unloyal state
ρ∗0 = 1 remains as the only solution. The same situation
appears for the chain of agents and for the Bethe lattice
with three neighbors, but with hb = 18 . Decrease of hb
with increasing lattice coordination number seems to be
natural, as for larger number of neighbors the transition
to unloyal state should appear earlier. Although much
details are lost in this description, the basic result—the
destabilization of the loyal state with an increasing input
of tasks—is reproduced.
FIG. 4: The time necessary to convert all agents to
unloyalty (τo) or to make them totally overburdened, i.e.
with M tasks scheduled for realization, (τt) as a function of
parameter K. L = 10, M = 16, Z = 4, R = 8, T = 3. The
results are averaged over N = 100 independent simulations.
B. Hysteretic rules
When back conversion of unloyal agents to loyal ones
is excluded it is just a matter of time when the system
will be totally overburden. Without agents relaxation
to loyalty (X = 0) the system inescapably tends to the
situation where all agents are unloyal and always have to
complete yet M tasks.
In order to avoid this ‘black scenario’ unloyal agents
must have a chance for relaxation to the state of loyalty.
However, even when back conversion is allowed for some
set of parameters the system ‘jamming’ may occur.
When unloyal agents are allowed to relax to the loy-
alty the ultimate system fate depends on assumed values
of parameters (K, T , R and Z). The phase space of pa-
rameters (K,T,R,Z) may be divided into two regions for
which system
• either tends to the ‘jamming’ state
lim
t→∞[〈k〉] =M, limt→∞[〈ρ〉] = 1, (8)
• or the average number of task awaiting for realiza-
tion and the average fraction of unloyal agents do
not reach their maximal values
lim
t→∞[〈k〉] < M, limt→∞[〈ρ〉] < 1. (9)
In terms of statistical physics we can talk about ‘or-
ganizational’ phase transition between ‘jamming’ and
‘making-it’ phases. The efficiency of tasks realization in
‘making-it’ phase depends quantitatively on applied re-
laxation rule [6(A) or 6(B)]. The results of simulations
for these two rules will be presented in subsequent two
subsections IVB1 and IVB2, respectively.
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(b)
FIG. 5: (Color online) (a) Time evolution of the total
number L2 · [〈k〉] of tasks scheduled for realization for
various values of maximal agents’ capacity M . (b) The time
necessary to make all agents totally overburdened (τt) as a
function of parameter M . L = 10, Z = 4, R = 4, K = 8,
T = 3. The results are averaged over N = 100 independent
simulations.
1. Returning to loyalty after completing all tasks (k = 0)
The time evolution of the average fraction [〈ρ〉] of loyal
agents and the average number [〈k〉] of tasks per agent are
presented in Figs. 7 and 8, respectively. The results were
obtained with the rule 6(A) applied in simulation, i.e.
when relaxation to loyalty is possible for an agent who
shifted out all of the tasks assigned to her/him. The frac-
tion of unloyal agents varies between 14% < [〈ρ〉] < 18%
for Z = 4, R = 8, T = 3 in ‘making-it’ phase (K ≤ 7)
[see Fig. 7a]. For K > 7 the system reaches a ‘jam-
ming’ phase. Using again statistical physics terminology,
we can say that on hyper-plane (Z = 4, R = 8, T = 3)
the critical value of parameter KC = 7 separates two
phases. Similarly, the critical values of TC = 3, RC = 8
and ZC = 4 on hyper-planes (Z = 4, R = 8,K = 7),
(Z = 4, T = 3,K = 7) and (R = 8, T = 3,K = 7) may
FIG. 6: The r.h.s. of Eq. (7) for various values of field h.
The saddle-node bifurcation appears when f(ρ) = 0 and
f ′(ρ) = 0, what defines the bifurcation field hb.
be deduced from Figs. 7b, 7c and 7d, respectively. The
same critical values of KC , TC , RC and ZC on mentioned
above hyper-planes may be observed in Figs. 8a, 8b, 8c
and 8d presenting time evolution of the average number
[〈k〉] of tasks assigned to agents. The system reaches
‘jammed’ phase for K > KC , T > TC , Z > ZC and
R < RC . Similarly to the case of irreversible transition
to the unloyalty (Sec. IVA) the role of maximal capac-
ity parameter M is quantitatively important only in this
‘jammed’ phase. For set of model controls parameters
corresponding to ‘making-it’ phase the changes of M pa-
rameter does not influence the results of simulations (till
M is larger than thresholds R and T ).
2. Relaxation to loyal strategy for sufficiently low number
of awaiting tasks (k ≤ T )
When agents strategy change from unloyal to loyal one
occurs as soon as they have less than T tasks the qual-
itative picture remains the same, i.e. we observe two
regimes in tasks realization in our model working group.
The results presented in Figs. 9 and 10 correspond to the
step 6(B) instead of 6(A) in our algorithm. The time
evolution of the average fraction [〈ρ〉] of unloyal working
group members and the average number [〈k〉] of tasks per
agent are presented in Figs. 9 and 10, respectively. The
only qualitative difference appears in system response to
changing R and T parameters: ‘jamming’ phase occurs
for small enough values of R < RC and large values
of T > TC when rule 6(A) is applied and it is absent
for rule 6(B). The common difference between results of
applying rule 6(A) or 6(B) is the average level of loy-
alty/unloyalty in working group and the average number
of tasks awaiting for realization. Selecting for inspection
the same hyper-planes as in Sec. IVB1 we see definitely
lower ranges of [〈ρ〉] and [〈k〉] in ‘making-it’ phase. These
differences are presented in Tab. I. Also the change of
9(a) M = 16, Z = 4, R = 8, T = 3 and various values of K
(b) M = 16, Z = 4, R = 8, K = 7 and various values of T
(c) M = 16, Z = 4, T = 3, K = 7 and various values of R
(d) M = 16, R = 8, T = 3, K = 7 and various values of Z
FIG. 7: (Color online). Time evolution of the average fraction [〈ρ〉] of unloyal agents obtained for 6(A) rule. L = 10. The
results are averaged over N = 100 simulations.
10
(a) M = 16, Z = 4, R = 8, T = 3 and various values of K
(b) M = 16, Z = 4, R = 8, K = 7 and various values of T
(c) M = 16, Z = 4, T = 3, K = 7 and various values of R
(d) M = 16, R = 8, T = 3, K = 7 and various values of Z
FIG. 8: (Color online). Time evolution of the average number [〈k〉] of tasks per agent obtained for 6(A) rule. L = 10. The
results are averaged over N = 100 simulations.
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TABLE I: The ranges of [〈ρ〉] and [〈k〉] on
(Z = 4, R = 8, T = 3), (Z = 4, R = 8,K = 7),
(Z = 4, T = 3,K = 7) and (R = 8, T = 3,K = 7)
hyper-planes and various variants of relaxation to loyalty.
The tasks number assigned to single agent cannot exceed
M = 16.
hyper-plane rule [〈ρ〉] (%) [〈k〉]
(Z = 4, R = 8, T = 3) 1−5+6(A) 14 16 0.4 0.9
1−5+6(B) 0 0.5 0.5 2.5
(Z = 4, R = 8,K = 7) 1−5+6(A) 14 14 0.9 0.9
1−5+6(B) 0 0.4 0.55 0.59
(Z = 4, T = 3,K = 7) 1−5+6(A) 10 16 0.75 0.85
1−5+6(B) 0 0.5 0.45 0.65
(R = 8, T = 3,K = 7) 1−5+6(A) 0 14 0.1 0.9
1−5+6(B) 0 2.5 0.1 0.9
TABLE II: The critical values of KC , TC , RC and ZC on
(Z = 4, R = 8, T = 3), (Z = 4, R = 8,K = 7),
(Z = 4, T = 3,K = 7) and (R = 8, T = 3,K = 7)
hyper-planes and various variants of relaxation rules to
loyalty. The ‘jammed’ phase is observed for values of K, T ,
R, Z larger than KC , TC , RC , ZC , respectively. The tasks
number assigned to single agent cannot exceed M = 16.
KC TC RC ZC
rules 1−5+6(A): 7 3 8a 4
rules 1−5+6(B): 12 —b —c 6
a For the rule 6(A) the transition to the ‘jammed’ state occurs
for R < RC .
b For the rule 6(B) on the hyper-plane (Z = 4, R = 8,K = 7)
only ‘making-it’ phase is observed.
c For the rule 6(B) on the hyper-plane (Z = 4, T = 3,K = 7)
only ‘making-it’ phase is observed.
critical parameters KC , TC , RC and ZC may be easily
observed (see Tab. II).
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In our model working group the crucial point for avoid-
ing system ‘jamming’ is allowing agents for relaxing to
loyalty. In case of applying hysteretic rules [6(A) or 6(B)]
the ‘black scenario’ of the system stacking in a ‘jammed’
phase may be avoided when
• either the number of agents chosen for task realiza-
tion K
• or the number of assigned tasks Z
• or the threshold value R of assigned tasks, which
force the agent to conversion from loyalty to unloy-
alty
• or the threshold value T of tasks assigned to unloyal
agent, which force him/her to task redistribution
among his/her neighbors
are smartly chosen. The term ‘smartly chosen’ means
• small enough for K, T , Z parameters and large
enough for the parameter R when rule 6(A) is ap-
plied
• and small enough for K and Z parameters for the
rule 6(B).
Basically, the influence of the model parameters on the
results of the simulations reflects what can be expected.
Yet, several results deserve more attention.
First one is related to the role of parameter T , which is
the threshold; if a unloyal agent has more than T tasks,
he/she shifts his tasks to his/her neighbors. When the
rule 6(B) is applied the larger value of T , the earlier
unloyal agents return to loyalty what should result in
smoother tasks realization; then it seems that the collec-
tive transition to the unloyalty phase should be less likely
when T increases. Yet, the numerical results presented in
Fig. 10b indicates that the trend is slightly opposite. On
the other hand, we well understand this trend for the rule
6(A) [see Figs. 7b and 8b]. The point is that a unloyal
agent does not perform her/his tasks even if their number
is less than T . In this super-selfish state agent neither
do his/her tasks nor send them to his/her neighbors. He
or she is just waiting till having again at least T tasks
and after receiving them above the threshold T he/she
redistributes them among his/her neighbors. Please note
however, once tasks are shifted, there is a chance that
some of them will be performed if a neighbor is still a
loyal agent. This hypothesis may be particularly attrac-
tive if we recall clustering of unloyal agents presented in
Fig. 2. The tasks shifted by unloyal agents may leave the
cluster of unloyal agents as soon as they reach its border.
The second issue is more complex: some numerical re-
sults seem to be stable, i.e. they remain constant in a cer-
tain range of at least some parameters. An example is the
percentage of unloyal agents, shown in Fig. 7a, as depen-
dent on the parameter K. Recalling that K is a measure
of the amount of incoming tasks, we should expect that
the amount of unloyal agents increases monotonously
with K. More exactly, the stream of incoming tasks is
the product K · Z, where Z is the number of incoming
tasks assigned to an agent. We could expect that the
amount of unloyal agents should be a function of this
product. Instead, what we observe is that the amount
of unloyal agents increases with Z but remains stable
with K, as shown in Fig. 7a. This puzzle remains to be
solved. A plausible hypothesis is that some amount of un-
loyal agents is functional as they help to transport tasks
throughout the system, making the spatial distribution
of tasks more homogeneous. Four tasks can be performed
by four loyal neighbors in one time step, not in four steps.
Within the range of parameters where the stability is ob-
served, the problem of overload is maybe solved locally.
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(a) M = 16, Z = 4, R = 8, T = 3 and various values of K
(b) M = 16, Z = 4, R = 8, K = 7 and various values of T
(c) M = 16, Z = 4, T = 3, K = 7 and various values of R
(d) M = 16, R = 8, T = 3, K = 7 and various values of Z
FIG. 9: (Color online). Time evolution of the average fraction [〈ρ〉] of unloyal agents obtained for 6(B) rule. L = 10. The
results are averaged over N = 100 simulations.
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(a) M = 16, Z = 4, R = 8, T = 3 and various values of K
(b) M = 16, Z = 4, R = 8, K = 7 and various values of T
(c) M = 16, Z = 4, T = 3, K = 7 and various values of R
(d) M = 16, R = 8, T = 3, K = 7 and various values of Z
FIG. 10: (Color online). Time evolution of the average number [〈k〉] of tasks per agent obtained for 6(B) rule. L = 10. The
results are averaged over N = 100 simulations.
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Yet, this hypothesis waits for a confirmation with dedi-
cated numerical tools, as the local correlation functions
of the task density.
The third issue is connected with ambiguous role of pa-
rameter R. It seems reasonable to expect scenario pre-
sented in Figs. 7c and 8c, i.e. when increasing of the
threshold value R after which loyal agents become un-
loyal group members helps system in staying in ‘making-
it’ phase. However, this natural system response to in-
creasing R is absent when rule 6(B) is applied. Yet, for
the variant 6(B), the overall amount of unloyal agents
is much smaller. Perhaps a weak increase of [〈ρ〉] and
[〈k〉] with R is related to a longer lifetime of an unloyal
agent, who has to shift more tasks (R − T ) to be con-
verted to an loyal agent again. Anyway, this increase
seems to be a second-order effect. On the other hand for
this rule when scanning R parameter we do not observe
a ‘jammed’ phase on (Z = 4, T = 3,K = 7) hyper-plane
[see Figs. 9c, 10c and Tab. II].
From the perspective of social simulation, the model
and results reported above fall into the category of YA-
WOTAS (‘Yet Another Way Of Thinking About Stuff’),
i.e. of analogical models rather than explanatory or pre-
dictive ones [28]. Yet, this category is shared with most
applications based on the technique of CA. According to
classic textbooks on social sciences [29], our research can
be classified as an exploration; here it deals with math-
ematical aspects of performance of groups of workers.
Our results suggest that the regime where their work is
efficient can be stabilized by a tuning of the system pa-
rameters. Also we hope that the memory effect captured
by hysteretic rules can be inspiring when looking solu-
tions to other problems, even so elusive as those met in
social sciences. Yet we should add that our mechanism
of switching to the unloyal state by passing duties from a
neighbor is more specific than social contagion in general.
Therefore, here we do not need to discuss the conditions
of an efficient social contagion, formulated in the litera-
ture [30, 31].
The model setting and the results can be treated as
a social realization of the concept of self-organized crit-
icality [32, 33]. When applied to a large system, these
frames suggest a research on the number of ‘topplings’,
i.e. events when a given task is passed along a chain of
coworkers. In our model, tasks are irreversible and it is
only their number which matters. Yet, the unloyal strat-
egy, when applied by the majority of agents, is equivalent
to the self-organized critical state, when no task is per-
formed; they are only passed from one agent to another.
We note that with the rule 6(A), this collectively un-
loyal state is absorbing, analogously to the very idea of
self-organization. On the other hand, the scale-free dis-
tribution of the length of the above remarked chains has
been discussed in Ref. [34] as a result of putting tasks
with lower priority off. These analogies promisingly link
theory of organizations to current problems of statistical
mechanics.
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